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Introduction
In recent years, both the EU and its member states have
paid allegiance to the goal of democracy and good
governance in Nigeria.1 Like elsewhere in Africa, this
pursuit - last reiterated at the recent EU-Africa summit
of December 2007 - has met with limited success, as the
recent, fundamentally flawed Nigerian presidential,
parliamentary and state elections testify. This study
examines how European democracy promotion has
played out in Nigeria. In practice, to what extent has
democracy been important for EU-Nigeria relations?
How have EU countries and institutions worked on the
ground to promote good governance? How is European
democracy promotion perceived in Nigeria? After the
debacle of the Nigerian elections of April-May 2007, in
which the EU had invested heavily,where do EU-Nigeria
relations stand? What, if any, has been the value added
by EU monitoring of these elections?
Nigeria is an obvious patient for anyone aiming to
eradicate the ills of inadequate governance in Africa. It
is infamous for its corruption, which has been fuelled
by the massive sums of money generated by oil.
Corruption in Nigeria is not, most observers agree, an
aspect of how the state bureaucracy works: it is in
many cases the main activity of the state. Corruption
and sleaze often leave the in-principle oil-rich
Nigerians without basic education or health care.2
Aside from corruption and electoral malpractices,
other governance-related problems include a poorly
administered system of justice, lack of state
transparency, and widespread human rights abuses
(such as extrajudicial executions, torture, destruction
of homes, state officials’ violence against women,
intimidation and harassment of journalists and human
rights activists3). Underlying all of this is a state with
shallow roots in a society marred by inter-ethnic,
economic, political, and religious conflict.
The European Union, a traditionally important player
in Africa and the world’s largest donor, increasingly
stresses governance in its relations with developing
countries in general and Africa in particular. Hence,
when the EU Parliament, Council, Commission, and
member states in 2006 presented a common vision
that will guide their future development actions,
governance and democracy held a prominent place.
They underlined that “progress in the protection of
human rights, good governance and democratisation is
fundamental for poverty reduction and sustainable
development”, and that, as a consequence, these issues
will be mainstreamed throughout all EU development
activities.4 The 2000 Cotonou Agreement, the most
recent partnership agreement between the EU and the
members of the African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP)
group of states, contains a similar provision.5 The EU
Strategy for Africa of 2005, which provides a
“comprehensive, integrated and long-term framework”
for EU-African relations, also stresses “good and
effective governance” as a “central prerequisite for
sustainable development”.6 Similarly, individual EU
states increasingly emphasize governance in their
bilateral development cooperation with African
states.7
What, then, has been the effect of EU and EU member
states’ policies with regard to democracy in Nigeria to
1 The author wishes to extend her thanks to the interviewees who
took their time to answer a long series of questions. Without them, the
report would not have been possible. Many thanks also to Richard
Youngs and Gareth Williams for comments on earlier drafts. The
responsibility for any errors remains with the author.
2 For a thorough illustration of the effects of corruption in Rivers
State, see Human Rights Watch, Chop Fine: The Human Rights Impact
of Local Government Corruption and Mismanagement in Rivers State,
Nigeria, New York: HRW January 2007.
3 Amnesty International (2007). Amnesty International Report
2007: The State of the World’s Human Rights London
http://thereport.amnesty.org/eng/Regions/Africa/Nigeria, United
Nations, 2007. “Special Rapporteur on Torture Concludes Visit to
Nigeria”, Press Release HR/07/35 12 March.
4 “The European Consensus on Development”, Joint statement by
the Council and the representatives of the governments of the Member
States meeting within the Council, the European Parliament and the
Commission on European Union Development Policy (2006/C 46/01),
paragraphs 86 and 101.
5 Partnership Agreement Between the Members of the African,
Caribbean and Pacific Group of States, and the European Community
and its Member States, signed in Cotonou, Benin on 23 June 2000.
6 EU Strategy for Africa: Towards a Euro-African pact to
accelerate Africa’s development SEC(2005)1255, Brussels, 12 October
2005.
7 For further details, see Youngs, Richard. “Fusing Security and
Development: Just another Euro-platitude?” FRIDE Working Paper 43,
September 2007.
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date? Put simply, the main obstacles are: dependence
on oil; lack of leverage; and lengthy assistance
procedures. This study shows that the problems with
European democracy promotion in Nigeria do not lie
primarily at programme level - although improvements
in project choice, design, or execution could be made.
Instead, they are to be found in the wider relationship
between Nigeria and the EU in which issues other than
democracy are paramount. Unsurprisingly, energy - as
well as, to a lesser extent, Nigeria’s regional great
power status and its fragile internal balance - have
made EU leaders quite timid in their defence of
democratic values in Nigeria. After the scathing EU
criticism of the elections, EU states quickly returned to
“business as usual” - to borrow the disillusioned words
of the European Parliament. Upon Umaru Yar’Adua’s
swearing-in ceremony on May 29, many EU
governments congratulated him on his election victory
in one way or another.8 There have been no moves,
beyond that of the European Parliament, to suspend
aid or use other measures that the Cotonou Agreement
would permit in such circumstances.
The lack of post-election actions notwithstanding, the
decision of the EU to send an election observation
mission to Nigeria in 2007, and the findings of the
mission, received almost unanimous support among the
Nigerian and international NGOs interviewed for this
report. However, issues of timing (the mission should
have started its work earlier) and coverage
(questioning the decision not to cover the Delta,
Bayelsa and Rivers states, considered too dangerous)
have been raised. There are also regrets that the EU
will not monitor the elections for local government
councillors, to be held before the end of 2007. These
elections are perceived as crucial for grassroots
democracy to gain hold. Most observers agree that the
writing was on the wall as regards fraud and
irregularities very early on in the 2003-2007 electoral
cycle. The question then becomes: could the EU have
done more to influence the process in 2005-2006,
when militias were armed, President Obasanjo was
seeking a constitutional amendment to win a third
term, and misgivings regarding the Independent
National Electoral Commission (INEC) grew
stronger? Another question concerns how the
international community, including the EU and EU
states, treats Obasanjo in the future: if he were
ostracised, this would send a strong signal to present
and future Nigerian leaders that undemocratic
behaviour is penalised.
Apart from election observation, what could the EU
and EU states realistically do to strengthen their
stance on Nigerian democracy? Firstly, it is important
to stress that EU leverage is limited. Nigeria is Africa’s
most populous country, and its dependency on aid is
low. Governance problems are massive and entrenched,
although the situation is, arguably, improving slowly.9
Unless the EU decides to upgrade its relationship with
Nigeria in a very significant way - Nigerian
interviewees talked longingly of a pre-accession status
for the country - expectations of visible results must be
scaled down accordingly. But even with this in mind,
changes could still be envisaged.
At the programme level, improvements could be made.
EC funding mechanisms are slow, and hence cannot be
responsive to political developments on the ground.
Even when money has been granted, disbursement is at
times delayed, which means that the Nigerian partners
are left stranded. The cumbersome processes
sometimes have the paradoxical effect of forcing
administrators to spend the allocated money fast -
which does not always mean well. The piecemeal
approach, with many small projects on various
governance-related issues, is also seen as problematic
at times, including by people inside the European
Commission. In their democracy assistance, both the
EU and the UK Department for International
Development (DFID) put emphasis on state
institutions rather than NGOs: a discussion on whether
the right balance between the two has been struck is
warranted. The DFID does not have the same
9 Interview, Graham Gass, Social Policy Adviser, DFID, Nigeria 4
Sept. 2007; USAID. Democracy and Governance Assessment of
Nigeria, prepared by ARD Washington, DC: USAID, December 2006.
8The German government, for example, sent a message of goodwill,
rather than formal congratulations.
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administrative requirements as the EU. However, its
close collaboration with the World Bank is not always
perceived in a positive light, and the British alliance
with the US in the war on terrorism has led to a certain
apprehension regarding its motives for democracy
assistance, which colours otherwise positive NGO
assessments of the DFID’s work.The German political
foundations, although quite small in comparison, are
mostly seen as nimble, credible, with good checks on
how funds are spent, and a willingness to provide in-
kind assistance to civil society organisations even if no
funding is available.
EU and DFID financing of the UNDP-managed Joint
Donor Basket Fund (JDBF) to support the 2007
elections receives strong criticism from Nigerian and
international NGOs, not least for its work with the
INEC. More generally, UNDP management of the
JDBF is widely seen as late, hasty, wasteful, and
undercutting the work of other international bodies by
lax spending and supervision. Other projects are viewed
positively, in particular service provision projects with
an integrated governance component. EU support for
the census has also received praise, even though results
in some places (Lagos and Kano) are seen as
politically motivated.
There is agreement across EU institutions, bilateral
donors, and NGOs that in the future, democracy
assistance should be more “bottom up”, with a focus
on state and local levels (although work there is often
more challenging than on the federal level because of
political resistance). Given the instability there, the
Delta states need specific attention. Corruption
continues to be an obvious target, with support for
transparency and accountability in public finance.
Other future priority areas on which there is relative
consensus include constitutional and electoral reforms,
the strengthening of the rule of law, and institutional
and civil society capacity building. Benchmarks for
measuring and comparing results have proved
successful in Nigeria, and could usefully be utilised in
the future as well, including for future election
preparations. Similarly, including a governance aspect
in service provision is a good way forward, as many
governance problems can only be dealt with in
conjunction with actual public policies.
On a more general level, it seems important that the
EU pursues and intensifies its shift from fossil fuels to
renewable energy, not only to help halt global warming,
but also to avoid double standards on democracy and
human rights vis-à-vis energy powers such as Nigeria.
It should also give incentives to European energy
corporations, very active in Nigeria, to do the same.
Today, international democracy promotion is not
viewed with the same scepticism in Nigeria as it is in
the oil-rich Middle East or Russia, for example. The
EU and EU states can hence hope to make an (albeit
modest) impact, both with their assistance projects
and at the political level. However, the balancing act
between Realpolitik and idealism is a risky one, and
prospects for democracy promotion could quickly
dwindle. In this respect, there also is a need for an EU-
wide discussion on the ethics of EU states promoting
national businesses in the third world: in a liberalised
and globalised economy, to what extent should states
protect private business interests abroad? Also, should
the same set of rules for corporate social and
environmental responsibility apply in Nigeria as in the
EU? As regards corruption, although efforts have been
made in recent years, some EU states could still do
more to prevent money illicitly gained from corruption
in Nigeria ending up in European banks, and to return
the so-called “Abacha funds”.
This study is based on interviews with representatives
from the EC Delegation to Nigeria, the European
Parliament, the European Commission in Brussels, EU
member state diplomatic representatives and
development organisations, and Nigerian and
international NGOs. Moreover, declarations,
agreements, statistics, and other material from EU
institutions and EU member states, as well as
secondary material, have been used to complete the
study.
       
EU-Nigerian relations:
A balancing act
between two unequal
giants
Democracy promotion is not a top priority in EU-
Nigerian relations. Oil is widely regarded as
paramount, followed by trade relations. Concerns over
migration, Nigeria’s role as a regional power, its fragile
internal balance, and attainment of the Millennium
Development Goals10 fill out the list. Given Nigeria’s
size, oil and gas wealth, and regional importance, EU-
Nigerian relations are more multifaceted than those
that Europe maintains with many other African
countries. At the same time, and precisely because the
relations cover so many policy areas, they can help
illustrate a number of issues relevant to relations with
other countries across Sub-Saharan Africa.
As is the case with many Sub-Saharan African
countries, relations between the EU and Nigeria have
been rocky since the latter gained its independence
from Britain in 1960. In the course of the second
period of dictatorship after Nigerian independence
(1984-1999),11 relations between Nigeria and EU
countries gradually soured. In 1993, the results of the
Nigerian presidential elections (which were supposed
to re-introduce democracy in the country) were
annulled. As a consequence, the EU suspended military
cooperation and training, introduced travel restrictions
for members of the security forces and their families,
and restricted high-level visits.12 In the aftermath of
the execution of Ken Saro-Wiwa and other Ogoni
leaders in late 1995 for their protests against Shell
operations in the Niger Delta, political relations came
to an almost complete standstill. The EU reinforced
travel restrictions, imposed an arms embargo, and
suspended most development cooperation with
Nigeria.13 The Shell connection notwithstanding, there
was no oil embargo and no freezing of Nigerian
leaders’ assets in Europe. EU companies, including oil
companies such as Shell and Total, also continued
operating in the country.The EU measures were lifted
after the elections in May 1999, following the death of
the military dictator Sani Abacha in 1998.14
With the return to democracy, political relations
between the EU and Nigeria were resumed, and the
charismatic new leader President Olusegun Obasanjo
quickly became something of a Western darling.
Development cooperation was quick to take off. In
1999, a EUR 100 million EU quick-start assistance
package covering 1999-2000 was granted, but due to
managerial problems on both sides, the first project
only started in the summer of 2001.15 In 2000,
Nigeria was one of the APC signatories of the Cotonou
Agreement. Following the quick-start package, a
country support strategy was signed between the EU
and Nigeria in 2002.The country strategy covered the
period 2001-2007 and was worth approximately EUR
600 million.16 This was the largest sum available to any
ACP country during that period, but among the
smallest on a per capita basis.17 Nigerian aid
dependency is generally low: net aid disbursements to
Nigeria during 2000-2004 averaged just 0.6% of
GDP, much less than most African countries.18 In
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10 Interviews conducted with EU officials, European diplomats and
aid agencies, international and national NGOs for this study.
11 According to certain classifications second and third periods, as
the 1993 interregnum is labelled the Second Nigerian Republic.
12 Common position of 20 November 1995 defined by the Council
on the basis of Article J.2 of the Treaty on European Union, on Nigeria
1995/515/CFSP.
13 Ibid. Exceptions were made for Nigerian participation in
regional projects and funding for democracy, human rights and
decentralised poverty alleviation activities (Nigeria-European
Community Country Support Strategy and Indicative Programme for
the period 2001–2007 p.18
http://www.delnga.ec.europa.eu/docs/CountryStrategy.pdf).
14 Council Decision of 17 May 1999 concerning Nigeria
(1999/347/CFSP).
15 European Community Country Support Strategy op cit, p.19.
16 This sum includes uncommitted balances of earlier EDFs
(Nigeria - European Community Country Support Strategy op cit,
p.31).
17 EC Delegation Nigeria “EU Nigeria Cooperation: Working
together to reduce poverty”
http://www.delnga.ec.europa.eu/eu_and_country/cooperation.htm
18 Utomi, Pat, Duncan, Alex, and Williams, Gareth. “Nigeria
Strengthening Incentives for Economic Growth: The political economy
of reform”, Oxford:The Policy Practice, 27 July 2006, pp-29-30.
     
2005, Nigeria received US $2 per capita in
development assistance, while the African average was
US $28 per capita.19 This means that donors cannot
set policy priorities in Nigeria, but instead must follow
the government’s lead, and be “strategically
opportunistic”, by reinforcing whatever positive
policies the Nigerian federal and state governments
decide on. “This is never going to be Malawi”, as one
interviewee put it.20 Debt relief was one of President
Obasanjo’s priorities when he came to power in 1999,
and in 2005 the government reached an agreement on
debt owed to Western states (the so-called Paris Club),
whereby US $18 billion was forgiven and US $12.4
was reimbursed.21 Democracy assistance was among
the first priorities of development aid.The quick start
package included EUR 6.6 million in support of
national and state assemblies, and EUR 7 million for
the promotion of democracy and human rights. EUR 5
million was given to support the 2003 elections.22
Apart from the EU and DFID, other donors were not
quick to move in, however, and even today few EU
states have a strong presence in Nigeria. One reason is
probably oil wealth - Nigeria was until recently
classified as a “blend” rather than “IDA-only” country,
which meant that it was not considered as among the
poorest or “worthiest” of the developing countries.23
Another reason evoked by interviewees is that EU
countries are wary of Nigeria, which tends to get bad
press, with a stereotyped image as a corrupt and
“impossible” place.24
In the military domain, cooperation also resumed
quickly. Arms exports to Nigeria began anew within a
couple of years after the end of dictatorship, and the
UK rapidly became the leading exporter, followed by
Italy and Germany. In 2004, EU countries licensed
exports of military equipment, such as ground vehicles,
aircraft, and large calibre firearms, to Nigeria worth
EUR 82 million, and for 2005 - the latest official EU
figure available - the figure was EUR 86 million.25
Military cooperation has also resumed, although the
United States is a crucial Western player in this
respect.26 The UK has provided funds and expertise for
military training and training facilities through its
African Peacekeeping Training Support Programme.27
For the first time in history, France and Nigeria have
established military collaboration, including through
RECAMP (Reinforcement of African Peacekeeping
Capacities).28 Since 2001, a small group of soldiers,
the German Technical Advisor Group (G-TAG), has
been stationed in Nigeria. Its main activities are
related to equipment maintenance and renovation of
the military hospital in Kaduna.29 Development of
security cooperation stems in part from the European
view that Nigeria is crucial to peace and security in
West Africa and beyond.30 As demonstrated by the
recently replenished EU-funded African Peace Facility
(a fund made available to pay for African
peacekeeping operations), Europeans would like to see
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25 Seventh Annual Report According to Operative Provision 8 of
the European Union Code of Conduct on Arms Exports (2005/C
328/01), p.140. http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/site/en/oj/2005/c_328/c_32820051223en00
010288.pdf, Eighth Annual Report According to Operative Provision 8
of the European Union Code of Conduct on Arms Exports.
(2006/C 250/01) p.168 http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/site/en/oj/2006/c_250/c_25020061016en00
010346.pdf
26 For a description of US activities in and around Nigeria, see
Lubeck, Paul M, Watts, Michael J, and Lipschutz, Ronnie. Convergent
Interests: US Energy Security and the “Securing” of Nigerian
Democracy, International Policy Report, Washington: Center for
International Policy, 2007, pp. 10-20.
27 Malan, Mark. “The European Union and the African Union as
Strategic Partners in Peace Operations: Not Grasping the Planning and
Management Nettle”, Kofi Annan International Peace Keeping Training
Center Paper No.13, 2006.
28 Hughes, Jean-Paul, “France-Africa Military Cooperation: The
big turnaround”, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, France
http://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/en/country-files_156/subsaharan-
africa_1962/military-cooperation-the-big-turnaround_2067.html,
“Field PK training”
http://www.un.int/france/frame_anglais/france_and_un/france_and_pea
cekeeping/field_pktraining_eng.htm
29 Embassy of the Federal Republic of Germany, Partnership and
Cooperation: An Overview of German Development Cooperation with
Nigeria, Abuja, May 2007.
30 See for example EU-Nigeria Ministerial Meeting, Final
Communiqué, Abuja, 18 May 2004.
19 World Bank and DFID. Country Partnership Strategy for the
Federal Republic of Nigeria (2005-2009). Report No. 32412-NG 2
June 2005, p.3.
20 Interview, Graham Gass, Social Policy Adviser, DFID, Nigeria, 4
Sept. 2007.
21 Paris Club. “Nigeria: Paris Club agrees on a comprehensive
treatment of Nigeria’s debt”, Press Release October 20, 2005. The
agreement did not cover Nigeria’s much smaller debt to private and
multilateral institutions.
http://www.clubdeparis.org/sections/services/communiques/nigeria9937
/switchLanguage/en
22 Youngs, Richard (forthcoming).
23 World Bank and DFID, 2005, op cit, p.4.
24 Interview, Graham Gass, Social Policy Adviser, DFID, Nigeria 4
Sept. 2007.
                  
more African-dominated peacekeeping on the
continent. Ever since independence, Nigeria’s
peacekeeping forces have been among the largest and
most active on the continent. Nigerian forces form the
backbone (approximately 70 per cent) of ECOMOG,
the ECOWAS non-standing military force. It ranked
ninth among the top-UN contingencies worldwide
during 2006 and first half of 2007. Nigeria has
personnel in 12 of 14 current UN peacekeeping
operations.The bulk, however, is in Liberia.31 Moreover,
some 2,000 Nigerian troops serve in Sudan, and a
further 850 are to be deployed in Somalia in African
Union peacekeeping missions.32 Security cooperation is
also motivated by Western interests in securing a
steady oil supply (for further details see discussion on
GGESS below). Security sector reform has lagged
behind European countries’ efforts to boost Nigerian
military capacity, however. To date, no European
security sector reform (SSR) programmes, or
programmes to improve the democratic control of the
armed forces exist in Nigeria, its military-dominated
past notwithstanding. However, the inclusion of an SSR
component in the 10th European Development Fund is
currently being discussed.33
Nigeria is the largest African country in terms of
population. Hardly surprising, it is also the Sub-
Saharan African country from which the largest
number of migrants leaves every year. A share of these,
especially women and children, are trafficked for
sexual exploitation, and end up in countries such as
Italy, Spain, Belgium, and the Netherlands.34 The flow
of migrants has led the European Union and individual
EU states to make readmission agreements with
Nigeria. The Cotonou Agreement includes a provision
stating that “each of the ACP States shall accept the
return of and readmission of any of its nationals who
are illegally present on the territory of a member state
of the European Union, at that member state’s request
and without further formalities”.35 Nigeria has
concluded bilateral readmission agreements with a
number of individual EU states, such as Italy, Ireland,
Spain, and the UK.36 Critics claim that with the focus
so squarely on repatriation, EU states and Nigeria
have overlooked ensuring better conditions of
admittance and residence for migrant labourers.37 EU
countries are regularly criticised by UN bodies, the
Council of Europe, and NGOs for their lack of respect
for human rights - such as the prohibition of torture,
inhuman or degrading treatment, right to due process,
the right of access to a lawyer, the principle of non-
refoulement, etc - in their handling of Nigerian and
other migrants.38
Many EU countries have strong and long-standing
commercial and economic ties to Nigeria. Oil and gas
extraction form the backbone of this relationship, but
other industries, such as infrastructure and services,
are also present in the country. The UK is one of the
largest investors. Over more than half a century, Shell
has invested several billion euros in the Nigerian oil and
gas sector. Other large British companies with
activities in Nigeria include British Airways, British-
American Tobacco, Cadbury, GlaxoSmithKline,
Guinness, Unilever, and Virgin Atlantic.39 Similarly, the
French presence is strong: cumulated French
investments in Nigeria are as large as those made in all
other West African countries taken together.40 This is
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31 All information from UNDPKO, “Monthly Summary of
Contributors of Military and Civilian Police personnel”
http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/contributors/
32 www.amis-sudan.org/military.html
33 Interview, Thierry Barbé, Desk Officer West Africa, EuropeAid
Cooperation Office, 20 September 2007.
34 Nigeria-European Community Country Support Strategy op cit,
p.21; Ijeoma Nwogu, Victoria. “Nigeria: human trafficking and
migration” Forced Migration Review No.25, May 2006.
http://www.fmreview.org/text/FMR/25/20.doc
35 Cotonou Agreement, Art.13; see also EU-Nigeria Ministerial
Meeting-Final Communique, Abuja, 18 May 2004.
36 Ijeoma Nwogu, Victoria, op cit, Legislation online, “Ireland:
International Cooperation on Migration.
http://www.legislationline.org/?jid=26&less=false&tid=141
37 Ijeoma Nwogu, Victoria, op cit.
38 Committee for the Prevention of Torture (CPT). The CPT
standards Strasbourg: Council of Europe, 2006; CPT. 13th General
Report on the CPT’s Activities (2002-2003), Strasbourg: Council of
Europe, 2003; United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights.
Statement by the Special Rapporteur of the Commission on Human
Rights on Torture, 26 October 2005;Webber, Frances. Border Wars and
Asylum Crimes, London: Statewatch, 2006.
39 Foreign and Commonwealth Office, UK “Nigeria Country
Profile:Trade and Investment with the UK”.
40 “La France et le Nigeria: Relations économiques”
h t t p : / / w w w . d i p l o m a t i e . g o u v . f r / f r / p a y s - z o n e s -
g e o _ 8 3 3 / n ig er i a _ 3 5 3 / f ra n c e - n ig er i a _ 1 1 9 6 / r e l a t io n s -
economiques_4121/relations-economiques_10432.html
            
especially noteworthy given France’s traditionally
strong ties to francophone West Africa. Again, the oil
and gas sector dominates (Total, Technip), but other
sectors such as manufacturing (Air Liquide, Lafarge,
and Michelin), services (Accor, Air France, SDV-
Bolloré, and Sodexho), and infrastructure (Alstom,
Areva, Bouygues, Groupe Eiffage, and Schneider) are
also represented.41 Italian companies, mainly in the
energy sector, construction, and shipping, are also
present. Italy has been involved in the Nigerian
petroleum industry since 1965, through The Nigeria
Agip Oil Company (NAOC) of the Eni group.The main
Italian construction companies operating in Nigeria
are the Impregilo Group, Cappa D’Alberto, Salini, Gitto
Construction, Borini Prono, AG Ferrero, Eagles
Construction, and Stabilini. Italian shipping companies
such as Ignazio Messina, Grimaldi Shipping Company,
Lloyd Triestino, Comet Shipping Line, and the
Mediterranean Shipping Company handle more than
30 per cent of the entire Nigerian maritime traffic.42
About fifty German companies operate in Nigeria, with
offices or production facilities.The largest construction
company in Nigeria, Julius Berger, is partly German-
owned and directed. Other large German firms include
Siemens and Deutsche Bank. German direct
investment in Nigeria has declined steadily in recent
years, from EUR 298 million in 2001 to EUR 75
million in 2004 (latest available figures).43
As the eleventh largest producer in the world, the
Nigerian economy is dominated by oil. Oil accounted
for nine tenths of government revenue and 99 per cent
of its exports in 2005.44 In its shadow, other previously
important industries such as agriculture (cash crops
and staple foodstuffs alike) and manufacturing have
either shrunk or disappeared outright. Oil exports are
set to grow, as the rate of new discoveries is high and
production is growing faster than in other regions of
the world. Oil extraction is technically easy in Nigeria,
and the quality of the crude oil is high.45 Hardly
surprising, energy accounts for the bulk of EU-
Nigerian merchandise trade: in 2006 close to 95 per
cent of EU imports from Nigeria derived from the
energy sector. However, EU dependency on Nigerian oil
is limited: Russia, Norway, Libya, Saudi Arabia,
Algeria, Iran and Kazakhstan all provide the EU with
more oil, gas and other sources of energy than Nigeria
does.46 The EU is also not the main Nigerian energy
customer. At EUR 10 billion, European energy imports
are dwarfed by those of the US, which were
approximately double that figure in 2006.47
Europe plays an important role nevertheless, as
European companies are very active in oil and gas
extraction in Nigeria. As noted above, Shell,Total, and
Agip, together with US-based Exxon Mobil and
Chevron Texaco, dominate the Nigerian energy
industry. Although technically easy, oil production in
Nigeria has become increasingly difficult at the
societal and political levels. Oil revenues have helped
fuel massive corruption while ordinary Nigerians
continue living in the deepest misery. According to
World Bank sources, approximately 80 per cent of oil
revenues are concentrated in the hands of 1 per cent of
the population.48 This, in turn, has created deep
resentment and a breeding ground for both political
contestation and violence, in particular in the Niger
Delta. As political protest has been unsuccessful and
violence has often proved to pay, the insurgency (often
targeting oil installations) has escalated in recent
years.49 Inequalities, environmental degradation (due
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20 Sept. 2007.
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to oil spills, the flaring of gas when extracting oil, etc.),
political alienation, and the destruction of the social
fabric have also helped fuel small-scale oil thefts, arms
dealing, protection rackets, and kidnappings. Large-
scale oil thefts, in contrast, are undertaken with the
help of high-ranking military officials, politicians, and
businessmen. Insecurity has led to important
disruptions of production. According to Alhaji Baba
Gana Kingibe, a high-level government official, Nigeria
lost about US $40 million daily when 500,000 barrels
of crude oil was shut in the Niger Delta, and cost
escalations ranged from 30 to 40 per cent.50 The
response of federal politicians has been to send in the
security forces. Local politicians have turned to armed
gangs - which are often involved in criminal activities -
for protection. Hence, as in many other countries living
off extractive industries, oil has drastically worsened
governance problems in Nigeria.51 As a consequence,
analysts and people from the donor community alike
stress the importance of working in the Delta region, as
instability there is a threat to the stability of Nigeria as
a whole.52
Although the links between (bad) governance and
extractive industries have been clear for a number of
years, the policy community has only started to address
the issue in earnest relatively recently. Hence, an EC
official said that it was in 2004 that they “discovered”
it was impossible to separate the Delta communities
and the oil companies, and that no solution can be
found without the involvement of all stakeholders.53
The issue of policy coherence has also become more
prominent in the last half decade,54 although up until
now it seems to have led to more concrete results in the
financial sector (see below) than in the Nigerian energy
sector.
Over the years, the Nigerian government has created a
number of different mechanisms to return some of the
oil money to the Delta region. As a rule, these have not
been very effective, and have often even been
counterproductive: very little money has reached the
poor, and corruption at the state level has remained as
widespread as ever. The same is true for the
“community outreach” activities of the multilateral oil
companies.55 Internationally, perhaps the most
important collaborative effort to “secure” the Delta
for oil production came in 2005, when Nigeria, the
United States and the UK set up the Gulf of Guinea
Energy Security Strategy (GGESS) to coordinate
efforts to stamp out oil theft, illegal small arms
dealings and money laundering. Since then, Canada,
France, Netherlands, Norway, and Switzerland have
joined.56 For Nigeria, this has meant that it now
receives assistance to equip and upgrade its
amphibious capacity, and that a tagging mechanism,
preventing stolen oil from being easily sold
internationally, has been developed. Although GGESS
has recently set up a working group on sustainable
development, there is no governance dimension to this
initiative.57 With its strong focus on energy security,
there is disagreement as to the value of GGESS. As one
European Commission official put it: “this is not the
right way forward”.58
More promising from a governance perspective is the
Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI).
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Its main goal is the verification and full publication of
company payments and government revenues from
extractive industries such as oil and gas. Nigeria was
the first country to sign up, and is also at the forefront
in implementing the EITI steps (ie: establishing multi-
stakeholder committees, identifying a government
“point person” to lead the process, drafting a national
work plan, selecting auditors) and has published a fully
audited and reconciled EITI report with data
disaggregated by company. However, the picture is not
perfect: Firstly, Obasanjo hand-picked the civil society
representatives on the multi-stakeholder committee
overseeing the process, and this committee has met
irregularly, fuelling perceptions that civil society is
being marginalised.59 Moreover, some companies were
“extremely slow” in providing information necessary
for the report.60 EITI was perceived positively by most
people contacted for this study, although some inherent
weaknesses are pinpointed: it focuses only on
government income, leaving aside issues arising both
prior to companies’ payments to governments (the
distribution of rights of exploration, contracting, etc.)
and those following them (such as budgeting and
spending according to budgets).61 It also leaves out
what oil companies pay to security providers and other
non-government entities.
EU democracy
promotion in Nigeria:
idealism, pragmatism,
and Realpolitik
As noted in the introduction, Nigeria’s ruling class is,
with few exceptions, notoriously corrupt and
unresponsive to societal problems and needs. Every
year since 2001, Transparency International, an anti-
corruption watchdog, has placed Nigeria close to the
top of the list of countries perceived to be the most
corrupt globally, and the World Wide Governance
Indicators of the World Bank do the same.62 It is
hardly surprising then, that governance-related
assistance holds an unusually important place in the
overall development assistance packages that the EU
and EU states provide to Nigeria. At the same time, the
role of Western—including EU—banks in handling the
immense proceeds of corruption in Nigeria has not yet
been given sufficient attention in all member states,
although great improvements have been made.
The EU and Nigerian elections
The most visible of the EU activities to promote
democracy in Nigeria have been election observation
missions.The EU sent its first such mission to Nigeria
ahead of the presidential, gubernatorial, national and
state assembly elections in 2003, and then again in
2007. The EU assessment of the 2003 elections was
severely critical. It found problems in almost all
aspects of voting: election administration; voter
registration; fraud and irregularities during the voting;
media coverage; announcement of results, etc.63 Early
on in the following electoral cycle it became evident
that the 2007 elections were likely to be marred by
similar problems. Most interviewees said that their
fears became strong more than a year before the 2007
elections, and many well before that.They cited factors
such as INEC mismanagement, the arming of militias,
and President Obasanjo’s attempts to tinker with the
constitution so as to be able to stand for a third term.
However, EU governments were not very active in
trying to change the course of events. According to one
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(Transparency International Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI),
various years, World Wide Governance Indicators (WGI) “Control of
C o r r u p t i o n ” .
http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi2007/home.htm).
63 ”Nigeria National Assembly Elections 12 April 2003,
Presidential and Gubernatorial Elections 19 April 2003, State Houses
of Assembly Elections 03 May 2003, European Union Election
Observation Mission Final Report”.
http://ec.europa.eu/external_relations/human_rights/eu_election_ass_o
bserv/nigeria/rep03.pdf
             
EU official, “in practice, beyond attending briefing
sessions that were INEC-led, EU member states did
not exert political influence that was strong enough to
change the direction in which the election
preparations went”.64 There were discussions as to
whether the EU should indeed monitor the 2007
elections. While the chief observer Max van den Berg
would not want to call it hesitation, “it was a serious
question to be researched” during the fact finding
mission.65 The team finally consisted of a ten-person
core team, 66 long-term observers, and 62 short-term
observers, watching over the elections in all states
except Delta, Bayelsa and Rivers state, which were
considered too dangerous.66
Many within and outside Africa saw the 2007 Nigerian
elections as a test for democracy, not only in that
country, but also across the whole of sub-Saharan
Africa. It was the first time in Nigerian history that
power would be transferred from one democratically
elected president to another. The dismay, although not
the surprise, was great when most observers, including
the Domestic Election Observation Group (with
50,000 Nigerian observers on the ground) and the EU
mission declared that the elections had been blatantly
rigged.67 Even the normally very discreet ECOWAS
noted “all the failings by INEC at all stages of the
electoral process”.68 The immediate EU reaction was
severely critical.The EU declared itself “disappointed”
and “deeply concerned that these elections were
marred by many irregularities and by violent incidents
resulting in a high toll of victims”. The EU stressed
attempts at vote rigging, “serious organisational
problems” in many states, and distortion of results.69
These views were echoed in the capitals of some EU
members. For example, London stated that it was
“deeply concerned”.70
At the same time, the EU post-election declaration
sketched a cooperative way forward: It stressed its
willingness to engage in dialogue with Nigeria in order
to “support Nigeria to overcome post-elections
difficulties and to take into account lessons learned in
view of the next elections”.71 Albeit with some delay,
EU member states also chose to congratulate
Yar’Adua before his swearing-in ceremony on 29 May.
Such developments made the European Parliament
fear that “the current ‘business as usual’ policy is
damaging and defeats the credibility of EU Election
Observation Missions”. It demanded that EU aid to
federal and state structures be withheld until new,
credible elections had been held.72 The EU
governments did not agree on any such freeze. Hence,
Article 96 of the Cotonou Agreement, whereby the EU
could have asked for special consultations or even
unilaterally decided on “appropriate measures”, was
not invoked. Sanctions under this article have to date
been used mainly against small states of little strategic
importance.73
Amongst NGO interviewees, the EU decision to send an
election observation mission in 2007 receives
unanimous support. As one interviewee put it: “I am
proud of the European Union because it did not
compromise.”74 The mission gave credence and moral
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support to Nigerians fighting for democracy.The report
on the elections was, in their view, complete and
credible. However, some Nigerian and international
NGO representatives felt that the mission should have
started its work earlier, and that the omission of Delta,
Bayelsa and Rivers states (for security reasons) was
unwarranted. Moreover, the focus on larger towns as
opposed to remote rural areas was also perceived as
unfortunate, although inevitable given the size of the
mission and the logistical problems involved. There
were also regrets that the EU would not monitor the
elections for local government councillors, to be held
before the end of 2007, which are perceived as crucial
for grassroots democracy to take hold.75
Many within the Nigerian establishment will admit, at
least in private, that the elections were flawed.76 Some
also did so in public. Hence, Senate President Ken
Nnamani said widespread irregularities would leave a
“legacy of hatred and a crisis of legitimacy for the
winner”.77 In his inaugural speech, Yar’Adua himself
acknowledged that “our elections had some
shortcomings” and has set up a 22-member panel to
examine and reform the electoral process.78 However,
this did not prevent INEC from strongly criticising the
EU final report, claiming the mission had acted
contrary to the EU’s own codes of conduct.79
The EU’s activities related to the Nigerian elections
have extended beyond voting. A EUR 40 million project
for the 2006-2011 period aims to strengthen the
capacity of INEC (responsible for preparing and
organising the elections) through advisory and
technical assistance, and to support civil society
involvement in the electoral process.80 The EU also
contributed to INEC, as well as to NGOs (for voter
education, gender monitoring and mainstreaming,
domestic electoral observation and media monitoring),
through the UNDP-managed joint donor basket
designed to support the 2007 elections. Unsurprisingly,
given that INEC was severely criticised for its
incompetence, lack of preparation, and partisanship,81
EU support for this institution is regarded with
scepticism. “Why invest in structures known to be
flawed?” a source in the international NGO community
asked. The EU delegation was aware of the problem,
and only spent part of the money allotted:“it was very
clear from the onset (from a technical assistance point
of view) that we were dealing with an ‘introverted’
elections management body which though keen for
international endorsement of the electoral process, was
not interested in sharing information that was critical
to election preparation and management”, according
to one EU interviewee.82 The reason for pursuing the
project anyway was strategic:“The timing between one
election and the next provides ample opportunity for
the election administration body and other
stakeholders to absorb lessons learned and focus on
building capacities to better prepare for the next
elections”.83 This has to be done “early, within the two
years following the election. After that the situation
heats up too much”.84 The EU is still awaiting a new,
reformed INEC or another reliable partner before
resuming assistance.85 UNDP management of the joint
donor basket has also been widely and severely
criticised for being hasty,wasteful, and for undermining
the work of other international bodies by lax spending
and supervision.“Waste” and “money badly spent” are
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recurrent NGO criticisms.86 Most interviewees find it
important to continue supporting the electoral process,
however. The question is how. For future elections, it
seems important to discuss the balance of pre-election
support: should a larger share go to grassroots NGOs,
political party development, the media, and the
security services? How much support should the
electoral institutions receive?
EU governance assistance projects
The European Initiative on Democracy and Human
Rights (EIDHR) is the specialised EU fund for
governance and human rights-related projects in
developing and transitional countries. For 2003-2009,
the resources allotted to Nigeria under this programme
amounted to approximately EUR 18.3 million.87
EIDHR micro- and macro-projects cover gender issues
(including women in politics and gender in budget
transparency and accountability), citizen participation
and civil society capacity building, budget transparency
and the role of the media in budget monitoring and
combatting corruption, advocacy on the Freedom of
Information Bill, issues related to sharia law, and
human rights promotion. Funding for EIDHR projects
in Nigeria generally amounts to a little less than a
million euros each. They have been of varying
effectiveness. EU officials stress the success of the
media budget-monitoring project in particular.88
The relatively modest EIDHR contribution - EUR 18.3
million for a country the size of Germany and France
combined - does not tell the full story of recent EU
support for Nigerian democracy and good governance.
In fact, a number of other EU projects have a clear
governance angle.89 These include: the project to assist
the Nigerian parliament and state assemblies, mainly
through training and the provision of material; the
Support to Reforming Institutions Programme,
focusing on improving management of public finances;
and support to the EFCC (Economic and Financial
Crimes Commission) and the judiciary in their fight
against economic and financial crimes, including
corruption. Still other projects have important
implications for governance in Nigeria. The national
census project is the largest of the EU projects in the
country, worth EUR 116.5 million, and implemented
together with the UNDP. It was designed to allow the
government to improve economic planning and service
provision, as well as provide a basis for electoral lists
for the 2007 elections. The Economic Management
Capacity Building Project aims to improve
coordination of social sector statistics and their use for
analysis at the federal level. According to one
interviewee, the project to assist the Nigerian
parliament has had only marginal effects. Such
assistance might work better on a bilateral basis,
because national administrations have a more directly
political interest in using the relations that are thus
forged, and, therefore, bilateral donors have shown
quite some interest in working in this area.90
Interviewees agree that support for the EFCC is
crucially important, even though its reputation was
somewhat tarnished during the election campaign, as it
was accused of politically motivated prosecutions.91
EU support for the census has also received praise,
even though results in some places (Lagos and Kano)
are seen as skewed to help maintain Nigeria’s delicate
religious balance.92
A governance aspect is also often built into more
service-oriented projects. This follows the Nigerian
government’s own poverty reduction strategy, NEEDS
(SEEDS on state level), which is founded on the
pillars of empowering people, building a social
contract, and changing the way government works.
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Hence, EU service provision projects work not only
with the local governments, but also with civil society
actors, whose capacity to monitor civil servants is
strengthened.Thus, a participatory approach was built
into the two micro-project programmes in Niger delta
states (MPP3 and MPP6) that centred on water
supply and sanitation, village transport, health
centres, schools and income-generation. However, an
NGO representative active in the region, while citing
the project as one of the most successful he had
encountered, found that the governance aspect had
been minimal. A DFID representative close to the
project echoes this, stressing that the project was
“governance blind” in that it bypassed local and state
governments entirely. While it had an impact on
community cohesion and set an example for
governments of how much little projects that are
financially transparent can actually cost, it did not
alter community-state relations.93 Among EC
officials, there seems to be unanimous support for
combining governance and service provision, in
particular as many governance problems cannot be
dealt with in the abstract, but only in conjunction with
actual public policies.94 The support given to SEEDS
benchmarking, where the performances of states were
compared with regard to policy setting, budgeting,
service delivery, and transparency, is often cited as
among the best projects. Peer pressure, many
interviewees agree, works well in Nigeria.95 Such
“bottom-up” projects with a focus on state and local
levels are, as a rule, more challenging, as governance
problems are even more severe than on the federal
level and patronage networks are very dense. However,
there is agreement across EU institutions, bilateral
donors, and NGOs that in the future democracy
assistance should increasingly target the more
cooperative states and local governments.
More generally, goodwill generated by EU election
monitoring seems to spill over onto its assistance
projects. The fact that the EU is multilateral also
makes it less threatening to those fearful of political
interference. However, some criticisms are recurrent.
EU funding mechanisms are slow, which means that
they cannot be responsive to political developments on
the ground. At most it can withhold funds, as it did
prior to the 2007 elections. Even when money has been
granted to a project, its disbursement is at times
delayed, which means that the Nigerian partners are
left stranded, and cannot keep promises at their end.
The cumbersome processes often has the paradoxical
effect of forcing administrators to spend the allocated
money fast — which does not always mean well. EU
funding, as well as DFID funds, are less flexible than
those of the World Bank, according to one interviewee:
if an organisation wants to change the order in which
it conducts certain activities, that often proves
difficult. The piecemeal approach, with many small
projects on various governance-related issues, is also
seen as problematic at times, including by people inside
the European Commission.
EU states’ programmes
Only a handful of EU member states have bilateral
development cooperation programmes in Nigeria. Of
these, only one, the United Kingdom, has a substantial
governance programme with presence on the ground.
However, although the German development agency
(GTZ) is focusing on other issues, three of Germany’s
political party foundations are working on democracy-
related issues in Nigeria, the Friedrich Ebert
Foundation (FES), the Heinrich Böll Foundation
(HBF), and the Konrad Adenauer Foundation
(KAS).96
UK development assistance is the largest of the EU
countries’ at GBP 213 million for 2004-2007, and
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increasing every year, from GBP 35 million in 2003-
2004 to a planned GBP 100 million in 2007-2008. It
is also the only country whose development
cooperation agency, DFID, has a country office in
Nigeria (since 2001 in Abuja, with regional offices in
Lagos, Enugu, and Kano).The work of DFID is, at least
in theory, squarely focused on governance issues. Of the
three key objectives which govern all British assistance
to Nigeria, two are governance-related: improving
public expenditure management and service delivery
(62 per cent of the programme budget) and
empowering people to demand reform and building a
social contract (19 per cent of budget).97 For 2005-
2009, the DFID and the World Bank have developed a
joint Country Partnership Strategy, and some
programmes are implemented jointly.98
The DFID supports a number of governance-related
projects, such as the EITI (see above), the State and
Local Government Programme, which provides
technical assistance in areas such as policy setting,
public financial management and service delivery, the
Security, Justice and Growth Programme, which
focuses on community policing and improved access to
legal services, and the Public Service Reform and
Service Delivery Initiative, aiming to restructure
federal ministries to improve service delivery and
strengthening presidential oversight in this area. The
DFID likewise supports efforts to strengthen the
national assembly, through support for selected
parliamentary committees and strengthening the links
between the legislature and civil society, and Coalitions
for Change (an initiative aiming to empower elements
within the media, civil society, government, and the
private sector to confront patronage and corruption),
along with Supporting Transparency and
Accountability in the Niger Delta (working with
selected Delta communities on a combination of issues:
service delivery, training, and empowerment vis-à-vis
the government). The DFID was also one of the
partners in the UNDP-managed joint donor basket for
the 2007 elections. There was also a separate, DFID-
run programme to support the elections.
The DFID does not have the same administrative
problems as the EU. Its programmes are often viewed
positively: interviewees mentioned the Security, Justice
and Growth Programme as successful, and Supporting
Transparency and Accountability in the Niger Delta as
promising.99 However, its close collaboration with the
World Bank is not always perceived in a positive light.
The British alliance with the US in the war on
terrorism and the latter’s quest for alternative sources
of oil supply have led to a certain apprehension
regarding British motives for democracy assistance.100
FES, HBF, and KAS all have permanent offices in
Nigeria, and yearly budgets of approximately EUR
700,000 to EUR 1 million each. The bulk of the
funding comes from the German Bundestag. FES has
been active in Nigeria since 1978. It is working in four
main areas: trade union cooperation, gender issues,
human security, and the national parliament. In its
work with the labour unions, FES’ main activity, it
attempts to build leadership and negotiation
capacities, support the work of trade unions on labour
standards, and help trade unions cope with
privatisations and the impacts of globalisation on the
workforce. It also tries to strengthen the influence of
women in the trade union movement. FES works
principally through training, capacity building, dialogue
forums and study trips, mainly making use of human
resources within Nigeria.101 HBF opened its Nigeria
office in 2002, but has operated in the country since
1994. It has been active on governance issues, with a
focus on human (and in particular women’s) rights,
civil society participation in politics, and conflict
prevention. Specific projects have included attempting
to improve knowledge and understanding of Sharia law
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London: DFID December, p.20.
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98 World Bank and DFID, 2005, op cit.
99 Interview,Joseph Hurst Croft,Stakeholder Democracy Network,
2 July 2007; interview, Ismaila Zango, Centre for Democratic Research
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July 2007, FES Nigeria: “About Us” http://www.fes-
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with the aim of fostering Nigerian national cohesion,
“Abacha loot monitoring” (ie: supporting NGO
monitoring of how the Abacha funds returned from
Switzerland were used), and training courses for women
and men to prevent old and new discriminatory practices
towards women.102 KAS reopened its offices in Nigeria
in 2001, after having closed them down during the
Abacha years. In 2006-2007, the Konrad Adenauer
Foundation concentrated on the upcoming elections,
through activities such as training of candidates for the
state assemblies in four states, training for police to quell
electoral violence, training for journalists, a radio
programme Vision Nigeria with interactive political
discussion that can be heard by people in northern
Nigeria, etc.103 The main problem for the three German
foundations is size: many of the interviewees for this
study did not know much about them.Those who knew
the foundations were very positive, citing them as close
to the ground, nimble, credible, with good checks on how
funds are spent, and a willingness to provide in-kind
assistance to civil society organisations even when no
other funding was available.104
The issue of consistency: looted
funds and corruption proceeds in
EU banks
Sani Abacha looted approximately US $3-5 billion
from the Nigerian people during his years in power.105
After the return to civilian rule, the new government
asked the international community for assistance in
returning the funds. Swiss banks eventually returned
USD 458 million to the Nigerian government in
2005.106 Abacha also stashed money in banks in the
UK, Jersey, Lichtenstein, and Luxemburg, but due to
lengthy litigation processes, so far, none of these
countries have returned funds, which remain frozen.
The UK Financial Services Authority refrained from
publicising the names of the British banks involved,
despite the fact that Swiss authorities did so for the
Swiss banks implicated in the affair.107 Given how
“nastily” the Swiss were treated in the return process
and how much bad publicity they got, other EU states
will want to be sure that any return of funds from their
countries is done discretely, according to a diplomatic
source in Abuja interviewed for this report.
Illicitly attained money has continued flowing from
Nigeria after the return to civilian rule. According to
World Bank sources, 70 per cent of Nigerian private
wealth is held abroad.108 Before the 2007 elections,
foreign exchange outflows reportedly increased
dramatically. Analysts reckoned that part of this
increase was due to so-called “politically exposed
persons” sending illicit money abroad.109 Moreover,
records most likely underestimate the outflows, as
illicit money is often expatriated outside official
channels. Banks in Great Britain, the Isle of Man,
Jersey, Lichtenstein, Switzerland, and, to a lesser
extent, the US, are all important recipients of these
funds.110 Non-Western destinations include Dubai,
Malaysia, Singapore, and China.111 While in the past
not many Western states were supportive, countries
such as the UK, Switzerland, and the US are now
“extremely helpful”.112 The watershed was not the
Sani Abacha scandal, but rather the 9/11 terrorist
attacks and the subsequent efforts to curb terrorist
financing networks. The Metropolitan Police have
restrained GBP 34 million in the last 3-4 years, and
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money is sent back to Nigeria regularly.113 However,
not all EU countries are equally quick to assist
Nigeria: cooperation with France, for example, is slow
and riddled with technical and communication
problems.114
Through their pledge of “policy coherence”, EU
countries have committed themselves to make sure
that illicitly attained funds do not find their way into
EU bank coffers.The EU and individual EU states also
recognise the importance of the issue through their
substantial support for the EFCC, an independent
Nigerian state institution that investigates and
prosecutes cases of corruption and other types of
financial crimes.The EFCC collaborates with financial
intelligence units internationally. European support is
not only financial, but also moral. Recently, the
government wanted to restrain the prosecuting powers
of the EFCC, but reversed its stance in the face of
strong criticism, including from the EU.115 As the
problem of money laundering in EU banks is “not
going to go away soon”116, these efforts need to be
sustained, and remaining loopholes in legislation
closed. Interviewees from the donor community for this
study generally showed low levels of knowledge of EU
and EU states’ efforts to combat money laundering.
That is somewhat surprising, given its centrality to
anti-corruption strategies.
Conclusions
The debacle of the 2007 Nigerian elections did not
have any major impact on relations between the EU
and EU governments, on the one hand, and Nigeria on
the other. Political relations were not strained. As the
electoral failure was widely predicted, the impact on
governance assistance projects has also been minimal.
The credibility of the EU has not, it seems, been
diminished in Nigeria as a result of the apparent
contradiction between the strong reaction of the EU
election observation mission and the subsequent
conciliatory approach of EU governments.There seems
to be quite generalised agreement that, while
democracy is not unimportant, it is not at the core of
the relationship between Nigeria and Europe.
This pragmatic approach, with glimmers of idealism,
may represent the art of the possible in the complex
relationship between the European power bloc and the
African giant. However, it is a delicate balance to keep.
Today, international democracy promotion is not
viewed with the same scepticism in Nigeria as in the
Middle East or Russia, for example. The EU and EU
states can therefore hope to make an (albeit modest)
impact, both through assistance projects and politics.
If European governments pursue their security and
economic interests - including the interests of
European oil giants active in the volatile Niger delta -
too persistently and without regard for social and
environmental concerns, this could change. As
governance, peace and security, environmental
degradation, poverty, migration, and energy security
are all intertwined, the price to pay for tilting the
balance too heavily in favour of the short term could be
high.
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In recent years, both the EU and its member states have paid allegiance to the goal
of democracy and good governance in Nigeria. Like elsewhere in Africa, this pursuit
- last reiterated at the EU-Africa summit of December 2007 - has met with limited
success, as the recent, fundamentally flawed Nigerian presidential, parliamentary
and state elections testify.This study examines how European democracy promotion
has played out in Nigeria and asks to what extent has democracy been important for
relations between the two? It finds that democracy promotion is not a top priority
and that in reality oil is widely regarded as paramount, followed by trade relations.
Concerns over migration, Nigeria’s role as a regional power, its fragile internal bal-
ance, and attainment of the Millennium Development Goals are also considered
important.
This pragmatic approach, with glimmers of idealism, may represent the art of the
possible in the complex relationship between the European power bloc and the
African giant. However, it is a delicate balance to keep.Today, international democ-
racy promotion is not viewed with the same scepticism in Nigeria as it is in the
Middle East or Russia, for example. The EU and EU states can therefore hope to
make an (albeit modest) impact, both through assistance projects and politics. If
European governments pursue their security and economic interests - including the
interests of European oil giants active in the volatile Niger delta - too persistently
and without regard for social and environmental concerns, this could change. As gov-
ernance, peace and security, environmental degradation, poverty,migration, and ener-
gy security are all intertwined, the price to pay for tilting the balance too heavily in
favour of the short term could be high.
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